The POITR satellite meeting in DEON2016 will take place at room H18, building NW II, University of Bayreuth, on July 21st, 2016.
14:30-15:15: Piotr Kulicki and Michael P. Musielewicz: Permissions and Related Obligations in LTS
15:15-16:00: Huimin Dong and Olivier Roy: Dynamic Logic of Power and Immunity
16:00-16:30: Coffee Break
16:30-17:15: Janusz Czelakowski: On the Conflict of Obligatory Actions
17:15-18:00: Huimin Dong and Norbert Gratzl: Open Reading for Free Choice Permission: A Perspective in Substructural Logics
- Abstract of ``Permissions and Related Obligations in LTS'':
We investigate the possibility of expressing permissions and obligations derived from permission occurring in hierarchical organisations within the framework of labelled transition systems (LTS). We start from the description of a running example – abortion cases at European Court of Human Rights. Then we introduce elements of the formal framework of LTS relevant to our investigations following papers of M. Sergot. Within the framework we try to express the following two intuitions:
1. We distinguish two notions of permission: inner (within a normative system) and outer (coming from the external source). We understand inner permission as weak permission – the absence of prohibition and outer permission as explicit one. Then we combine both in such a way that we check whether actions that are explicitly permitted are weakly permitted.
2. The LTS settings allows us to label actions with agents' actions. Some actions require co-operation. Permission for agent i1 derives obligation for agent i2 when any action realising the permission of agent i1 requires co-operation from agent i2.
We study a framework inspired by dynamic epistemic logic to analyze legal competences, i.e. powers and immunities in Hohfeld's sense of norm-changing actions. We show that this results in a novel, sophisticated but nonetheless reductive approach to legal competences. We then analyze the combinatorics of these dynamic normative positions, and as a case study analyze how strong (dynamic) permissions give rise static obligations.
The paper proposes a solution to the problem of conflict of obligations. We speak about a conflict of obligations of actions when we come to deal with a pair of obligations, e.g., legal and moral, legal and religious, medical and religious, medical and religious, etc., which mutually exclude execution of the given action. In this work we undertake to define the conflict in terms of action systems. Though the paper is a continuation of the research carried out in “Freedom and Enforcement in Action: Elements of Formal Action Theory,” it seems that the approach to conflicts presented here has not been considered in the deontology of actions.
This paper proposes a new solution to the well-known Free Choice Permission Paradoxes, combining ideas from substructural logics and non-monotonic reasoning. Free choice permission is intuitively understood as ``if it is permitted to do A or B then it is permitted to do A and it is permitted to do B.'' Yet one of its logically equivalent form allows the following inference which seems clearly unacceptable: if it is permitted to order a lunch then it is permitted to order a lunch and not pay for it. The challenge for a logic of free choice permission is to exclude such counter-intuitive consequences while not giving up too much deductive power. We suggest that the right way to do so is using a family of substructural logics augmented with principles borrowed from non-monotonic reasoning. This follows-up on a proposal made in ``Open reading without free choice.''